CASE COMMENTARIES
BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
Under Sixth Circuit law, filing a suit in an attempt to settle a case
does not constitute an abuse of process. Penn, LLC v. Prosper Bus. Dev.
Corp., 600 F. App’x 393 (Jan. 23, 2015).
By Harolda Bryson
In Penn, LLC v. Prosper Bus. Dev. Corp., 600 F. App’x 393 (Jan. 23,
2015), the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed
the issue of whether filing a suit in an attempt to settle a case constitutes
an abuse of process, absent evidence of an improper ulterior motive.1
In 2000, Penn, LLC (“Penn”) and Prosper Business
Development Corporation (“Prosper”) together formed BIGresearch,
LLC (“BIGresearch”). Each party owned 50 percent of BIGresearch’s
shares, and its board consisted of one representative from Penn and two
representatives from Prosper. Following the formation, BIGresearch
sold approximately five percent of its shares to outside investors.
In 2004, Prosper purchased a portion of the sold shares, giving it
a majority stake in BIGresearch, and used its newfound majority
ownership to remove Penn’s representative from the board. In response,
Penn challenged the legality of Prosper’s actions and demanded
arbitration.
In 2008, the arbitrator ruled in favor of Penn and restored Penn’s
membership on the BIGresearch board. In addition, a third-party was
appointed to determine the amount of distributions that Penn’s shares
should have earned during the “freeze-out” period, even though Prosper
still occupied a majority of the board.
In 2009, while the third-party was preparing the report, Prosper
voted to completely dissolve BIGresearch. In response, Penn filed suit in
an Ohio court, seeking to enjoin the dissolution. In 2010, while the Ohio
suit was pending, the third-party’s financial report was finished and the
arbitrator adopted the damages award of $1,488,000 in favor of Penn.
Later, in 2011, the court found that the dissolution was valid.
On appeal, Prosper and Penn entered into settlement
negotiations, where Prosper offered to pay Penn $1,500,000 in exchange
for a release from all liability. Following the offer, Penn countered with a
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit also addressed other issues
not covered in this synopsis.
1
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request of $1,750,000. Weeks later, Penn’s attorney called Prosper’s
attorney in order to remind him of the settlement and to inform him that
Penn “intended to file a new complaint against Prosper . . . unless it
accepted the proposal.” Penn called a second time stating the same thing,
but also threatened to sue Prosper’s counsel as co-defendants. A month
later, the Ohio court upheld the arbitrator’s award and reduced it, such
that Prosper only had to pay an amount of approximately$750,000 to
Penn.
Penn filed suit once more against Prosper, alleging RICO
violations, fraud, conversion, unjust enrichment, and breach of fiduciary
duty. After filing the suit, Penn called Prosper again to talk about the
settlement, offering to accept the $750,000 award as part of the
$1,750,000 it previously requested. Prosper then filed a counterclaim,
alleging abuse of process.
Under the applicable forum state’s law, in this case Ohio, an
abuse of process counterclaim requires:
1) that a legal proceeding has been set in
motion in proper form and with probable
cause; 2) that the proceeding has been
perverted to attempt to accomplish an
ulterior purpose for which it was not
designed; and 3) that direct damage has
resulted from the wrongful use of the
process.
At trial, the District Court upheld Prosper’s counterclaim, reasoning that
Penn used threats and the suit as “bargaining chips” to leverage
settlement negotiations. Penn appealed. 2 On appeal, the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s holding, finding
that Penn did not engage in an abuse of process.
Under Sixth Circuit law, generally, it is not an abuse of process to
file a suit in an attempt to settle a case. First, an abuse of process claim
must show that the suit involves issues that are not properly before the
court. Second, it must be shown that the proceeding has been perverted,
such that the abusing party is attempting to use the court to order
something that it is powerless to order. Finally, the abusive suit must
have damaged the other party.

2

Penn only challenged the second part of the test.
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The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals found that Penn’s suit did
not constitute an abuse of process because: 1) Penn’s claims were viable
and properly before the court; 2) Penn’s requested relief by the court was
proper and within the court’s power; and 3) Prosper failed to show how
it was damaged by Penn’s suit. As such, the United States Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling, holding
that a party may file a lawsuit in an attempt to settle a case, as long as the
party is not filing the lawsuit in an effort to achieve an improper ulterior
objective.
In light of this decision, transactional attorneys in the Sixth
Circuit should know that federal courts apply the forum state’s law on
filing an abuse of process claim, and that filing a suit or threatening to
file a suit in an attempt to settle a case, does not constitute an abuse of
process, unless the suit alleges violations that are improperly before the
court. Further, for an abuse of process claim to be upheld, the claiming
party must provide evidence showing an ulterior motive to filing the suit.
Courts have found ulterior motives where the party who initiated the
lawsuit asked the court to reach beyond its authority, or where the party
alleges invalid claims or claims unrelated to the subject matter of the suit.

CONTRACTS
The Supreme Court of the United States held that courts shall
interpret welfare plans contained in employee collectivebargaining agreements using ordinary principles of contract law.
M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C. v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015).
By Spencer Cook
In M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C. v. Tackett, 135 S. Ct. 926 (2015),
the United States Supreme Court addressed whether ordinary principles
of contract law permit an inference, drawn from extraneous knowledge
of labor bargaining, that absent a specific durational clause, retiree health
care benefits vest for life. In Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, Inc., 561
F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2009) (“Tackett I”), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit applied the holding from its previous decision in International
Union, United Automobile, Aerospace, & Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (UAW) v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983) (“YardMan”) and its progeny, requiring courts to infer the external context of
labor negotiations when considering whether collective-bargaining
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agreements create a vested right to lifetime welfare plans. In M & G
Polymers USA, L.L.C. v. Tackett, the United States Supreme Court held
that courts shall interpret welfare plans contained in employee collectivebargaining agreements using ordinary principals of contract law,
abrogating Yard-Man and its progeny.
This case arose out of a collective-bargaining agreement between
M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C. (“M & G”) and the United Steel, Paper
and Forestry, Rubber, Manufacturing, Energy, Allied Industrial and
Service Workers International Union, AFL-CIO-CLC (“the Union”). In
2000, M & G purchased the Point Pleasant Polyester Plant (“Plant”) and
entered into a collective-bargaining agreement with the Union that
represented the Plant’s employees. This collective-bargaining agreement
(“C.B.A”) promised that qualifying retirees, along with their surviving
spouses and dependents, would receive a fully company-funded welfare
plan for the duration of the C.B.A., which provided for renegotiation in
three years. In 2006, M & G began requiring that all retirees contribute
to the costs of their welfare plan, stripping the retirees of their rights to
the previously company-funded welfare plans.
After M & G ended the employee-funded welfare plan, retirees
of the Plant, their spouses, and their dependents (“Retirees”), brought a
class action suit against M & G, asserting claims under the Labor
Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”) and the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 891 (“ERISA”). The
Retirees alleged that M & G, through the terms of the C.B.A., vested its
Plant retirees, their surviving spouses, and their dependents with a right
to lifetime contribution-free health care benefits.
The district court dismissed the Retirees claims, holding that the
language contained within the C.B.A. unambiguously did not create a
vested right to retiree benefits. Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C.,
523 F. Supp. 2d 684 (S.D. Ohio 2007).
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
Retirees’ stated a plausible claim based on collective-bargaining
inferences established in Yard-Man. Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, Inc.,
561 F.3d 478 (6th Cir. 2009). The court of appeals’ previous decision in
Yard-Man, and its progeny, required courts to infer “that parties to
collective bargaining intend[ed] retiree benefits to vest for life because
such benefits are ‘not mandatory’ or required to be included in
collective-bargaining agreements, are ‘typically understood as a form of
delayed compensation or reward for past service,’ and are keyed to the
acquisition of retirement status.” The court of appeals reversed and
remanded the district court’s dismissal of Retirees’ claims.
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On remand, the district court conducted a bench trial and ruled
in favor of the Retirees. The district court declined to answer whether
the C.B.A. created a vested right to retiree benefits, “concluding that the
[c]ourt of [a]ppeals had definitively resolved that issue.” Tackett v. M & G
Polymers USA, L.L.C., 853 F. Supp. 2d 697 (S.D. Ohio 2012). The Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in favor of the Retirees, holding that
“although the [d]istrict [c]ourt had erred in treating Tackett I as a
conclusive resolution of the meaning of the [C.B.A.], it had not erred ‘in
presum[ing]’ that, ‘in the absence of extrinsic evidence to the contrary,
the [C.B.A.] indicated an intent to vest lifetime contribution-free
benefits’.” Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C., 853 F.3d 589 (6th Cir.
2013) (“Tackett II”).
On a grant of certiorari, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth
Circuit Court of Appeals’ “decision [in Tackett II] rested on principles
that are incompatible with ordinary principles of contract law.” The
Court vacated and remanded the Sixth Circuit’s decision in Tackett II.
The Supreme Court explained that while “ERISA imposes elaborate
minimum funding and vesting standards for pension plans . . . it
explicitly exempts welfare benefit plans from those rules.” Because
welfare plans are required by ERISA to be established and maintained
pursuant to a written instrument, the Supreme Court observed that
“contractual provisions ordinarily should be enforced as written . . .
especially when enforcing an ERISA [welfare benefits plan].’”
The Supreme Court noted that the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which relied on its previous decision in Yard-Man, incorrectly
applied ordinary contract law in Tackett II. The Supreme Court declared
that Yard-Man “violate[d] ordinary contract principles by placing a thumb
on the scale in favor of vested retiree benefits in all collective bargaining
agreements.” The Supreme Court concluded that Yard-Man’s holding
allowed for courts to ascertain the intentions of the parties “not from the
record evidence, but instead from its own suppositions about the
intentions of employees, unions, and employers negotiating retiree
benefits.”
Furthermore, the Supreme Court added that the holding in YardMan, as applied in Tackett II, violated other fundamental contract laws,
such as: 1) applying external inferences when construing durational
clauses in provisions governing retiree benefits; 2) the misapplication of
the illusory promises doctrine, which “instructs courts to avoid
constructions of contracts that would render promises illusory because
such promises cannot serve as consideration;” 3) the traditional principle
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that courts should not construe ambiguous writings to create lifetime
promises; and 4) the traditional principle that “contractual obligations
will cease, in the ordinary course, upon termination of the bargaining
agreement.” The Sixth Circuit’s misapplication of ordinary contract laws
required the Supreme Court to abrogate Yard-Man and its progeny. On
remand, the Supreme Court mandated that the Sixth Circuit apply
ordinary principles of contract law when it reexamines Tackett.
The Court’s decision in Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C.,
drastically departs from prior Sixth Circuit precedent. With the
abrogation of Yard-Man and its progeny, the Sixth Circuit must begin a
new chapter in interpreting the intent of the contracting parties in
welfare plans contained in collective-bargaining agreements. The Sixth
Circuit may no longer apply its own external knowledge of labor
negotiations to infer the intent of the contracting parties. Additionally,
the Court’s abrogation of Yard-Man changes the status quo of collectivebargaining agreements in favor of employers. It may become more
difficult, if not impossible, for unions to negotiate for or maintain
employer contributed welfare plans without conceding other important
terms in a collective-bargaining agreement.
To ensure that courts can easily interpret the terms of a
collective-bargaining agreement, practitioners should strive to have each
party’s intent easily discerned within the “four corners of the document.”
Furthermore, Tackett v. M & G Polymers USA, L.L.C., dictates that all
parties engaged in collective-bargaining should, now more than ever, be
aware of the ordinary laws and principles of contract law when drafting a
collective-bargaining agreement.

COPYRIGHT
The Supreme Court held that the equitable defense of laches does
not bar relief on a copyright infringement claim brought within the
three-year statute of limitation period. Petrella v. MGM Inc., 134 S. Ct.
1962 (2014).
By Danielle Knight
In Petrella v. MGM Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014), the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether the equitable defense of laches may
bar relief on a copyright infringement claim brought within 17 U.S.C. §
507 (b)’s three-year limitations period.
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Frank Petrella (“Mr. Petrella”) and Jake LaMotta (“LaMotta”)
collaborated in writing two screenplays and a book. 3 In 1976, Mr.
Petrella and LaMotta assigned their rights to all three works to ChartoffWinkler Productions. Two years later, Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (“MGM”)
acquired the motion picture rights to the screenplays. The rights were
stated to be “exclusive and forever, including all periods of copyright and
renewals and extensions thereof.” In 1980, MGM released the film
Raging Bull, based off the acquired screenplays and book, which is still in
circulation today.
In 1981, Mr. Petrella died during the initial copyright term, and
his renewal rights reverted to his daughter Paula Petrella (“Ms. Petrella”).
In 1991, Ms. Petrella renewed the 1963 copyright and became the sole
owner of the copyright. Over the next eighteen years, Ms. Petrella’s
attorney notified MGM that she owned the 1963 copyright and was
threatening legal action for copyright infringement.
In 2009, Ms. Petrella took action and filed a copyright
infringement suit in the United States District Court for the Central
District of California, alleging MGM’s violation of her 1963 copyright.4
MGM moved for summary judgment based on the equitable defense of
laches. The district court granted MGM’s motion for summary
judgment, finding that Ms. Petrella’s eighteen-year delay in commencing
the suit was unreasonable and prejudicial to MGM. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, finding
that Ms. Petrella was aware of her rights for many years and delayed her
suit because “the film hadn’t made money.”
On certiorari, the Supreme Court of the United States sought to
resolve: 1) how the equitable defense of laches applies to copyright
claims; and 2) the irreconcilable outcomes of circuit splits.
The Copyright Act of 1976 (the “Act”) protects an author’s
original works from infringement by unauthorized parties. Copyright
owners may transfer ownership to a third-party, reproduce and distribute
the copyrighted work, and are protected for a predetermined time based
on the date of publishing. Copyrighted works published before 1978, as
in this case, are initially protected for twenty-eight years, with the option
The first screenplay was registered in 1963, the second screenplay was registered in
1973, and the book was registered in 1970.
4 Ms. Petrella only sought recovery of damages for the time-period on and after January
6, 2006, because the statute of limitations for copyright claims requires a suit to be
brought within three years of the infringing action.
3
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of renewal up to sixty-seven years. Additionally, for pre-1978 works, the
Act allows an heir to inherit the renewal rights.
Civil actions brought under the Act must be filed within three
years of the infringing action. Copyright statutes of limitation follow the
separate-accrual rule: each infringing action starts a new three-year
limitations period.
First, the Supreme Court held that the defense of laches was
improperly used because its use should be limited to cases in which no
statute of limitations applies. Here, the copyright statute of limitations
provides for a three-year look-back period, arising from the date of the
infringing action.
Second, the Supreme Court held that the defense of laches does
not prevent a copyright owner from “sitting still,” in order to determine
the likely outcome of an infringing action (also known as an
expectations-based delay). The separate-accrual rule allows copyright
owners to defer a suit “until she can estimate whether litigation is worth
the candle.”
In light of this decision, transactional attorneys should be aware
that each copyright-infringing action begins a new three-year statute of
limitations period. The defense of laches should not be used to defend
copyright claims and should only be used when a statute of limitations is
non-existent. Finally, such suits may be delayed, allowing the potential
plaintiff to see the result of the infringing action, but any profits earned
by a defendant, outside of the three-year look-back period, are not
recoverable.

LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
Under Tennessee law, employees who fail to take all reasonable
and necessary steps to protect their employment, voluntarily
terminate their employment, disqualifying themselves from
receiving unemployment benefits, absent good cause. Practical
Ventures, LLC v. Neely, No. W2013–00673–COA–R3–CV, 2014 WL
2809246, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 19, 2014).
By Sonali Arora
In Practical Ventures, LLC v. Neely, No. W2013–00673–COA–R3–
CV, 2014 WL 2809246, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 348 (Tenn. Ct. App.
June 19, 2014), the Tennessee Court of Appeals addressed the issue of
whether an employee voluntarily terminated her employment, where the
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employee was suspected of fraud, was temporarily suspended from her
employment, responded by stating that she was planning on resigning
anyway, and did not cooperate with the employer’s internal investigation.
The addressed issues were key in determining whether the employee was
eligible for unemployment benefits or not.
Gordon Ballenger (“Ballenger”), the owner and general manager
of Practical Ventures, owned and operated AAA Cash Fast (“Cash
Fast”). Cash Fast was in the business of providing cash advances and
title loans. Danyelle McCullough (“McCullough”) was the manager of
Cash Fast’s Memphis, Tennessee branch, and was responsible for
managing customers’ loans and Cash Fast’s accounting.
On January 25, 2010, McCullough submitted a closing report
that included a summary of the store’s loans and transactions for that
day to Ballenger. While Ballenger was reviewing the report, he noticed
the information in the copy of a check was blank, except for the amount.
After investigating, Ballenger found $15,468 worth of accounting
discrepancies.
Two days later, Ballenger spoke to McCullough over the phone
and told her that an investigation was under way regarding the financial
discrepancies in her reports, that her security code had been changed,
that she was suspended until further notice, and that she needed to
return her copy of the store key. McCullough told Ballenger that she was
not concerned about her job because she was planning on quitting on
the following Saturday. McCullough never returned to the store to dropoff the keys or contacted Ballenger again. McCullough was charged with
seventeen criminal offenses, of which sixteen were dropped. The
remaining criminal charge was for forging financial documents.
Several months later, McCullough filed an application for
unemployment compensation with the Tennessee Department of Labor
and Workforce (“Department”). The Department denied McCullough’s
application, stating that McCullough was disqualified from receiving
benefits because she was terminated for misappropriation of company
funds. McCullough appealed to the Department’s Appeals Tribunal.
On appeal, the tribunal reversed the prior denial of benefits,
finding that McCullough was qualified for benefits. The tribunal found
that McCullough was constructively discharged because Ballenger, by
suspending McCullough before she told him she was quitting, denied
McCullough the right to work first.
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Ballenger appealed the decision to the Department’s Board of
Review, which affirmed the tribunal’s holding. Ballenger then filed for
judicial review in the Chancery Court of Shelby County, Tennessee. The
trial court upheld the Department’s decision, holding that McCullough
was effectively terminated, supported by substantial and material
evidence, and that the Department did not act arbitrarily and
capriciously. Ballenger appealed once more.
On appeal, the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that
McCullough was not constructively discharged 5 , and that she was
ineligible for unemployment benefits. Tennessee unemployment statutes
were enacted to improve the economic effects of involuntary
unemployment on workers and their families. Workers, who leave their
job voluntarily and without any good cause, are not
entitled to unemployment benefits. “Courts will find that an employee
has voluntarily terminated her employment if the employee fails to take
all necessary and reasonable steps to protect his or her employment.”
McPherson v. Strokes, 954 S.W.2d 749 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997).
The appellate court reversed the trial court’s decision, holding
that McCullough voluntarily terminated her employment because she
failed to take all necessary and reasonable steps to protect her
employment. Specifically, McCullough failed to cooperate with the
investigation, did not return the store key, stated that she was planning
on resigning, and never returned to work. Thus, McCullough was
ineligible to receive unemployment benefits because she voluntarily
terminated her employment after Ballinger notified her that she was only
being suspended.
In light of this decision, transactional attorneys in Tennessee
should be aware that if an employee voluntarily terminates their job
without good cause, they are be ineligible for unemployment benefits.
The voluntary termination of unemployment benefits occurs when an
employee fails to take all reasonable and necessary steps to protect their
employment. Although this is a fact-intensive inquiry, employee actions
before, during, and after the conduct in question should be taken into
account.

The doctrine of constructive discharge was improperly applied in this case because it
is inapplicable in an administrative unemployment compensation proceeding. The
doctrine of constructive discharge is applicable under state and federal laws prohibiting
discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Practical
Ventures, LLC, 2014 Tenn. App. LEXIS 348, at *26.
5
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PROPERTY
Under Tennessee Law, the applicable statute of limitations is
determined by utilizing the Vance two-step approach to analyze
the gravamen of the claim. Benz-Elliott v. Barrett Enter. LP, 456 S.W.3d
140 (Tenn. 2015).
By Zachary Campbell
In Benz-Elliot v. Barrett Enter. LP, LP, 456 S.W.3d 140 (Tenn.
2015) the Tennessee Supreme Court clarified the two-step Vance
approach, used to determine the gravamen of a case, in order to apply
the proper statute of limitations. In clarifying the Vance two-step
approach, the Tennessee Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether
Benz-Elliott should be governed by a three-year statute of limitations for
injuries to property, or a six-year statute of limitations for breach of
contract.
In Vance v. Schulder, the Tennessee Supreme Court outlined a
two-part analysis to identify the gravamen of a complaint. Vance v.
Schulder, 547 S.W.2d 927 (Tenn. 1977). The Vance court sought to correct
the problems associated with prior decisions by requiring the
“consideration of both the basis of the claim and the type of injuries for which
damages are sought.” Vance, 547 S.W.2d at 932 (emphasis added).
In Benz-Elliott, Brenda Benz-Elliott (“Ms. Elliott”) brought suit
against Ronnie Barrett (“Defendant”) and Barrett Enterprises, LP
(collectively “Defendants”). Ms. Elliott owned ninety-one acres in
Rutherford County. The Defendant owned four acres located on Miller
Road, adjacent to Ms. Elliott’s property. In 2004, Defendant approached
Ms. Elliott about purchasing a portion of her property. Ms. Elliott
initially sold five acres to Defendant, with the condition that she would
retain access to a sixty-foot wide strip along Miller Road to connect her
remaining property to the public road. Further, Defendant agreed to
extend Miller Road according to county specifications along I-24. The
sale was then finalized on March 25, 2005. The warranty deed, however,
failed to include the contractually-required reservation to provide the
sixty-foot strip. Both parties relied on a letter from the Tennessee
Department of Transportation (“TDOT”) that the required reservation
would be available.
On September 22, 2008, Ms. Elliott filed suit against Defendants.
She later amended her complaint on October 21, 2008, alleging claims
for breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent
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misrepresentation. Ms. Elliott requested specific performance and
money damages. The Defendants filed an answer to the amended
complaint and, pursuant to an agreed order, later amended their answer
to include the three-year statute of limitations provided in Tennessee
Code Annotated § 28-3-105, among five other affirmative defenses.
At trial, the court dismissed Ms. Elliott’s claims of intentional
and negligent misrepresentation, finding that Ms. Elliott had failed to
prove her claims. In determining whether there was a breach of contract,
the trial court focused first on the road, finding that Defendant did not
build the promised road. Next, the trial court found that the sixty-foot
reservation to connect Ms. Elliot’s land did not exist. In light of these
two facts, the trial court ruled in favor of Ms. Elliott for the breach of
contract claim. The trial court determined that Defendant failed to
establish the defenses of estoppel, waiver, laches, statute of limitations,
and modified comparative fault. The trial court declined to order
specific performance for Ms. Elliott because the defendant had already
constructed buildings on the purchased land. Instead, the trial court
awarded Ms. Elliott $850,000 in damages for the diminution in value of
her remaining property, as a result of not having access to a connecting
public road.
At the November 1, 2012 hearing on remand, maps introduced
into evidence showed that Miller Road was relocated behind Defendant’s
property, and that the road extended to the southwest corner of Ms.
Elliott's property, giving her access to a public road. Russell Parrish, an
appraiser testifying on behalf of Ms. Elliott, stated that the diminution in
value of Ms. Elliott's remaining property from the lack of an ingress and
egress along I-24 was valued at $1,066,496. Johnny Sullivan, an appraiser
testifying on behalf of Defendants, stated that in light of the new access
road, Ms. Elliott sustained no diminution in value of her remaining
property. The trial court reduced Ms. Elliott’s award for diminution of
value by $200,000.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the gravamen of the
claim for which Ms. Elliott prevailed was based on damages to real
property, and concluded that her claim was barred by the three-year
statute of limitations. Subsequently, Ms. Elliott's application for
permission to appeal was granted pursuant to Tennessee Rules of
Appellate Procedure 11.
The Tennessee Supreme Court, exercising de novo review, held
that Ms. Elliot’s claims are to be governed by the six-year statute of
limitations for breach of contract claims. The Tennessee Supreme Court
acknowledged that the Vance two-step approach had resulted in
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irreconcilable differences, and clarified it in the case at hand. The court
held that in order to determine the applicable statute of limitations,
courts should determine the gravamen of the claims by: first, considering
the legal basis for the claim; and second, considering the type of injuries
for which damages are sought.
In applying the Vance two-step approach, the Tennessee
Supreme Court found that the legal basis of Ms. Elliot’s claim was
breach of contract, and that the damages sought were remedies for
breach of contract. Thus, the court held that Ms. Elliot’s claims are to be
subject to a six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract, instead
of the three-year statute of limitation for real property damages.
In light of this decision, transactional attorneys in Tennessee
should be aware of the Vance two-step approach, as clarified by the
Tennessee Supreme Court in this case. In determining the applicable
statute of limitations for each claim brought, the gravamen of the claim
should be determined by analyzing the legal basis of the claim, followed
by the types of damages sought.

SECURITIES
Under the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, a
misrepresentation or omission of material fact must be material to
a decision to buy or sell a “covered” security, in order to be made
“in connection with” that purchase or sale. Chadbourne & Parke LLP
v. Troice, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014).
By Luke Smith
In Chadbourne & Parke LLP, 134 S. Ct. 1058 (2014), the United
States Supreme Court determined how broadly to construe to language
of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (the “Act”),
which requires fraudulent misrepresentation to be made “in connection
with” the purchase or sale of a covered security.
Prior to Chadbourne, Allen Stanford (“Stanford”) and his
companies sold certificates of deposit (“CDs”) in Stanford International
Bank (“the Bank”) to four groups of private investors (“Plaintiffs”),
promised a fixed rate of return, and promised that the CDs were secure
because they were backed by the Bank’s significant holdings in covered
securities. Plaintiffs’ CDs were not in fact invested, or backed by covered
securities, but were part of an elaborate Ponzi scheme. The funds were
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used to repay previous investors and to provide a lavish lifestyle for
Stanford, among other things.
In Chadbourne, Plaintiffs brought separate civil class action suits
against the firms and individuals who helped the Bank sell its CDs by
working as investment advisers, attorneys, or insurance brokers for the
Bank (collectively “Defendants”). Two groups of Plaintiffs filed actions
in Louisiana state court, claiming that Defendants helped perpetrate
fraud, thereby violating Louisiana state law. Defendants had their cases
removed to federal court. Two other groups of Plaintiffs filed their
actions in the federal court for the Northern District of Texas, claiming
that Defendants helped the Bank perpetrate securities fraud or hide it
from regulators, thereby violating Texas law. The cases were
consolidated in the District Court for the Northern District of Texas.
The district court dismissed all four actions under the Act,
reasoning that the CDs were not covered securities because they were
not traded nationally or listed on a regulated exchange. Further, the court
found that the Bank’s misrepresentations did not provide a sufficient
“connection” with the purchase or sale of a covered security to trigger
the Act and dismiss the cases.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed,
concluding that the Bank’s misrepresentations were “tangentially related”
to the “crux” of the fraud claims, triggering the Act. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in order to determine the scope of the Act’s phrase
“misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connection with the
purchase or sale of a covered security.”
Under the Act, securities class action suits are not permitted on
state law claims based on “ a misrepresentation or omission of a material
fact in connection with the purchase or sale of a covered security.” A
“covered” security is one that is “listed, or authorized for listing, on a
national securities exchange.”
The Court held that a fraudulent misrepresentation or omission
is made “in connection with” the “purchase or sale of a covered
security” when it is material to a consumer’s decisions to buy or sell a
“covered security.” “In connection with” refers to those who maintained
or divested an ownership interest in the covered security. 6 Thus, the
The Court showed concern that a broader interpretation would prohibit states from
being able to provide remedies for victims of more garden-variety fraud. Under a
broader interpretation, the Act would prohibit a suit brought by creditors of a business
that falsely represented that it was creditworthy, in part because it owns or intends to
own a covered security.
6
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Court held that Plaintiffs’ allegations failed to state misrepresentations
that were “in connection” with the purchase or sale of a “covered
security,” because the misrepresentations alleged were solely about the
Bank’s fraudulent assurances. Consequently, the necessary connection
between the materiality of the misstatements and the purchase or sale of
a covered security did not exist.
In light of this decision, transactional attorneys should know that
the Court intends for the phrase “in connection with” to be broadly
construed, in order to allow flexibility in a court’s choice of remedies.
Also, in determining whether or not a fraudulent misrepresentation has
been made, it is important to show that the consumer’s decision to
purchase or sell a covered security was influenced by a material
misrepresentation.

TRADEMARK
The Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (the “FDCA”) does not
preclude commercial entities from bringing lawsuits against their
competitors, under the Lanham Act, for allegedly deceptive
labeling of a product, even if the challenged aspects of the labeling
are specifically required or authorized by the FDCA. POM Wonderful
LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014).
By Rebekah Raymond
In POM Wonderful LLC v. Coca-Cola Co., 134 S. Ct. 2228 (2014),
the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a private party may
bring suit under the Lanham Act, challenging a label regulated by the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the “FDCA”). The unanimous Court
held that the Lanham Act and the FDCA are complementary, and that a
private party is not precluded by the FDCA from bringing suit under the
Lanham Act.
POM Wonderful LLC (“POM”) produces, markets, and sells a
variety of pomegranate products, including a pomegranate-blueberry
juice blend. POM competes in the pomegranate-blueberry juice market
with Coca-Cola’s Minute Maid brand. POM sued Coca-Cola under the
Lanham Act for unfair competition arising from false or misleading
product descriptions, which allegedly deceived consumers, and injured
POM as a competitor. POM alleged that Coca-Cola’s product name,
label, marketing, and advertising misled consumers into believing that
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the product consisted predominately of pomegranate and blueberry juice,
when it only consisted of 0.3 percent pomegranate juice and 0.2 percent
blueberry juice.
Congress enacted the Lanham Act nearly seven decades ago in
order to protect commercial entities from unfair competition. The
Lanham Act allows a competitor to sue another competitor for unfair
competitive advantages, arising from false or misleading product
descriptions.
The FDCA regulates foods, drugs, and cosmetics, in order to
protect public health and public safety. In doing so, the FDCA relies
solely on the United States government for its enforcement, as there are
no private rights of action provided for by the FDCA. Under the FDCA,
misleading labels for foods and beverages are prohibited. A food or
beverage is deemed misbranded if: 1) its labeling is false or misleading; 2)
the information required to appear on its label is not conspicuously
displayed; or 3) its label does not bear the common or usual name of the
food. Under the FDCA, the Food and Drug Administration (the
“FDA”) has regulatory authority over food and beverage label claims. To
implement the above stated provisions, the FDA promulgated
regulations regarding food and beverage labeling, one of which states:
“[i]f a juice blend label does not name all the juices it contains and
mentions only juices not predominant in the blend, it is misleading
unless it either declares the percentage content of the named juice or
indicates that the named juice is present as a flavor or flavoring.”
The United States District Court for the Central Division of
California granted partial summary judgment to Coca-Cola on POM’s
Lanham Act claim, ruling that the FDCA and its regulations preclude
challenges to the name and label of Coca-Cola’s juice blend. The court
reasoned that since the FDA had not prohibited, but rather in some
instances expressly permitted, aspects of Coca-Cola’s label, it would, in
this instance, be inconsistent with FDA regulations to allow a Lanham
Act claim.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in relevant
part, and “out of respect for the statutory and regulatory scheme barred
POM’s Lanham Act claim.” The court reasoned that: 1) Congress had
entrusted matters of juice beverage labeling to the FDA; 2) the FDA had
promulgated comprehensive regulation of that labeling; and 3) the FDA
apparently had not imposed the requirements on Coca-Cola’s label that
POM sought. The Court of Appeals further explained that for a court to
act when the FDA had not, despite regulating extensively in this area,
would risk undercutting the FDA’s expert judgments and authority.
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The Supreme Court held that the FDCA does not preclude
Lanham Act claims, reasoning that the two federal laws at issue are
complementary. Further, the Lanham Act’s purpose is to protect
commercial entities from unfair competition, while the FDCA’s purpose
is to protect consumer health and safety. Finally, neither the FDCA nor
the Lanham Act contain limiting language with respect to unfair
competition claims. If the FDCA was intended to bar certain claims
brought under the Lanham Act, Congress could have added a provision
addressing this issue during the seventy year existence of the Lanham
Act.
In light of this decision, attorneys should know that the Lanham
Act and the FDCA are complementary federal laws with the same overall
goal: to prevent companies from misleading consumers and creating
unfair competitive advantages. It is not enough for a company to be in
compliance with the FDCA’s regulations because: 1) being in compliance
with FDCA regulations will not preclude a Lanham Act claim; and 2)
compliance with FDCA regulations is not a defense to a Lanham Act
claim. Companies regulated by the FDCA must be careful to ensure that
they are properly following FDCA regulations, while not engaging in
misleading or deceptive marketing practices.

